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Epistemic Modal Disagreement
October 18, 2015
ABSTRACT: At the center of the debate between contextualist versus relativist
semantics for epistemic modal claims is an empirical question about when
competent subjects judge the presence of epistemic modal disagreement.
John MacFarlane’s relativist claims that we judge there to be epistemic modal
disagreement across the widest range of cases. We wish to dispute the
robustness of his data with the results of two studies. Our primary
conclusion is that the actual disagreement data is not consistent with
relativist predictions, and so, that the primary motivation for relativism
disappears. Our study differs from a related study by Knobe and Yalcin
(2014) in that we focus directly on the question of genuine disagreement, as
opposed to a question about truth or the appropriateness of retraction.
Some of our findings agree with theirs about relativism. We uncover new
lessons along the way, including that there are widespread situation effects
of epistemic modal discourse; idiosyncratic features of the vignettes
significantly influencing judgments about epistemic modal disagreement.
We reflect with mixed feelings on the prospects for contextualism to
accommodate our findings.

The contextualist and relativist agree that the truth value of an epistemic possibility
claim of the form
“It might/may be that p”
is sensitive to the epistemic states of members of the relevant group. For the
contextualist the relevant group is a function of the speaker's context of utterance,
and for the relativist it is a function of the assessor’s point of evaluation of the
speaker's utterance. The following are familiar tokens of the contrary frameworks:
(Contextualism)
“It might/may be the case that p”, as uttered by x in the epistemic sense, is
true at the relevant point of assessment iff p is compatible with the set of
propositions known by x (and perhaps her conversational partners) at the
world and time of utterance.
(Relativism)
“It might/may be the case that p”, as uttered by x in the epistemic sense and
assessed by y, is true at the relevant point of assessment iff p is compatible
with the set of propositions known by y at the world and time of y's
assessment of x's utterance.

1

The contextualist framework (not necessarily the above instance) is the dialectical
default, not only because (unlike relativism) it invokes machinery that is already
familiar in formal semantics (e.g., in the received view of indexicals, demonstratives
and quantifiers), but also because epistemic modals (unlike, say, knowledge
attributions) pass with flying colors standard linguistic tests for context sensitivity.1
The two frameworks agree that epistemic modal truth values swing with changes in
epistemic states, but disagree on whether those states need to be a function of the
speaker’s context of use. Movement from the default contextualist position to a
more exotic relativist framework then requires forceful motivation. In that spirit the
relativist emphasizes empirical data that allegedly only she can accommodate. The
most fundamental is the so-called disagreement data (of which the “eavesdropping
data” is a special case).
Eavesdropping cases put the two speakers at a distance. For instance, Jane is at the
bus stop wondering where her bus is, and says to her friend, “We may have missed
the bus.” George, who is also at the bus stop, is eavesdropping and mumbles, “She's
wrong. They can't have missed the bus. I've been here for an hour and know it has
not come.” Our relativist, the brand that we will be criticizing, claims that the
natural reading is that our eavesdropper, George, is denying Jane's epistemic modal
claim---that literally, George and Jane cannot simultaneously speak the truth. They
genuinely disagree.2
The view is that the relativist, but not the contextualist, can straightforwardly
accommodate the eavesdropping data. After all, p is compatible with the set of
propositions known by the speaker (and her group), and the eavesdropper does not
dispute that. By contrast, p is not compatible with what the assessor knows, when
the assessor is the eavesdropper. The relativist concludes that her own framework,
even if exotic, is superior to the dialectical default at explaining such basic epistemic
modal talk.
This paper provides new data to the dispute. We do not rehearse the full range of
criticisms that have been waged for and against the two positions. Nor do we
discuss all the positions that fall under these two general categories. Instead we
wish to evaluate the robustness of the disagreement data in particular, since it has
been highlighted as a primary motivation for relativism. We evaluate the empirical
question of when subjects take speakers to disagree about epistemic modal matters.
When is the disagreement-reading available to competent native ears? Note that,
because disagreement questions require complex assessments of situations, these
data undoubtedly reflect several factors beyond semantic competence. This is,
indeed, likely to be the case in any experimental investigation of complex cognitive
We have in mind here the binding test, and the licensing test in particular. Cf
Jonathan Schaffer (2009) on epistemic modals and Jason Stanley (2005b, Chapter 3)
on knowledge-attributions.
2 The familiar line is developed in Andy Egan, John Hawthorne, & Brian Weatherson
(2005), Egan (2007), and in John MacFarlane (2011).
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phenomena. We contend that we can still learn something about semantic
competence in the face of this variation in other factors, however. In particular, the
second experiment reported here attempts to factor out a number of non-semantic
aspects of the broader context and still finds some robust differences in
disagreement intuitions, even in the face of substantial ‘situational’ variation that is
unrelated to the interpretation of epistemic modals per se.
There are other related characterizations of the data that are said to be in need of
explanation. For instance, there is y’s (and our) inclination to judge x’s epistemic
modal claim as false, and there is x’s alleged inclination to retract her initial modal
claim in response to y’s overt denial.3 However, the disagreement data is more
fundamental. If we are inclined to judge x and y as genuinely disagreeing over an
epistemic modal matter (in the sense that x and y cannot both speak the truth), then
that would explain why we (and y) are inclined to judge x as having said something
false (in light of y’s better epistemic position). And it would explain our inclination
to judge it appropriate for x to retract her initial claim (once appraised of y’s better
epistemic position). The converse is not the case. For instance, there is a natural
socio-pragmatic explanation of y’s inclination to (mistakenly) judge x as having said
something false---e.g., in terms of y’s confusion as to whether x is using the modal
epistemically or counterfactually.4 Such “slippage” in interpretation on y’s part is
not readily converted into an explanation of why we take x and y to be engaged in a
genuine dispute (if/when we do). After all, on the slippage account, x and y are not
in dispute; x expressed an epistemic modality, but y disputed a counterfactual
modality.
Similarly, not all explanations of appropriateness of retraction convert into an
understanding of judgments about disagreement. Knobe and Yalcin (2014) for
instance suggest that speakers sometimes retract epistemic modal claims, not
because they think their claim is false, but rather because they no longer wish to
make its contribution to the common ground. Such cases tell us nothing about why
we take x and y to be engaged in a genuine dispute (if/when we do). For such an
explanation of the retraction does not even suppose that x has said something false,
but rather that x withdraws a certain contribution from the background.
We focus on the disagreement question also because retraction data is obviously not
available in the more decisive eavesdropping cases. In the eavesdropping cases x
cannot retract in light of y’s more informed perspective because she is unaware of
y’s perspective. States of disagreement between two parties, by contrast, can be
evaluated even if the parties are unaware of each other.
Section 1 rehearses MacFarlane’s problem of lost disagreement. If MacFarlane is
correct, then for any (interesting) brand of contextualism C, there is a modal
3
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These are among the data studied in Knobe and Yalcin (2014).
Hawthorne (2009) gives a version of this sort of explanation.
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epistemic disagreement that C cannot explain.5 Section 2 is an examination of
MacFarlane’s target notion of disagreement. If the notion is sufficiently clear and
characterizes a state that is tracked by intuitive judgments, then it can inform the
question of how to test empirically for the presence of this semantic phenomenon.
For readers already familiar with the “arguments from lost disagreement” and the
target notion of disagreement (i.e. the preclusion of join accuracy), we encourage
skipping ahead to Section 3, where we discuss the data collected from our two
studies. In both of our studies subjects take there to be much less epistemic modal
disagreement than relativism predicts. Other lessons are drawn. For instance, in
Study 2 we find that the conversational relation (e.g., being in same conversation
versus being in a remote eavesdropping scenario) has less effect on peoples’
judgments about disagreement than does the non-modal subject matter and setting
(e.g., FBI surveillance scenario about a person’s location versus a classroom setting
about a score on a math test). Study 1 can be understood to support contextualism
up to a point, however Study 2 leaves us with more questions than answers about
the correct theory of our epistemic modal talk.
1. The Problem of Lost Disagreement
The point of this section is to demonstrate the problem of lost disagreement, which
is the centerpiece in MacFarlane’s argument against contextualism in favor of
relativism. There are multiple drafts of the argument, one for each version of
contextualism that MacFarlane considers. The essential structure quickly becomes
clear. Each argument begins with a person x making an epistemic modal claim, “it
might be that p”, for some contingent proposition p, and another relevantly more
informed person y uttering a syntactic denial of x’s utterance---for instance, “It can’t
be that p”. We are asked to consult our pre-theoretic intuitions and notice and x and
y are in a state of genuine disagreement---i.e., that they dispute some epistemic
modal matter, in the sense that they cannot both speak the truth. The final stage of
the argument demonstrates that the version of contextualism in play does not
predict a disagreement in that scenario, for it does not issue enough shared content
between x and y to ground a genuine dispute. Rather, it interprets x and y in such a
way that they may both speak the truth.
We begin with solipsistic contextualism. It is solipsistic in that it says that all and
only the speaker’s knowledge is relevant for the proper evaluation of a might-claim.
Solipsistic Contextualism, or (SC), says
(SC)
“It might be that p” is true as uttered by x (at time t) iff p is compatible
with K,
More specifically, he concludes that, for any brand of contextualism C, either (i) it
is unclear how speakers can take themselves to be suitably placed to make a mightclaim or (ii) there is a modal epistemic disagreement that C cannot explain. So we
read “interesting” as “any account for which it is clear how speakers can take
themselves to be suitably placed to assert a might-claim”.
5
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where K is the set of propositions known by x (at time t).6
Minimally, contextualists take the truth-value of the might-claim to turn on the
knowledge in question (in this case, the speaker’s knowledge). Typically
contextualists will make the stronger claim that the knowledge in question plays a
content-determining role as well. Our thoughts about contextualism will not decide
between these differences, since for the case of non-embedded epistemic modals
(and their negations) the corresponding contextualist positions predict the same
truth values, and so, the same verdicts about genuine dispute. However, by
“contextualism” we will refer to the stronger position throughout.
The argument from disagreement against (SC) is a one-two punch that goes like this:
Punch 1: A dialog is presented in which an apparent epistemic modal dispute is
exhibited between speakers, in this case between Sally and George:
(Boston)
Sally and George are discussing Joe's whereabouts. Sally says, "Joe
might be in Boston." George replies, "Joe can’t be in Boston. I just had
breakfast with him here in Los Angeles 30 minutes ago."7
That is, we are asked to consult our intuitions, and notice that we pick up on a
genuine (epistemic modal) disagreement between Sally and George. The sense of
“disagreement” is meant here to be a non-technical notion---in the sense that it is
something that ordinary non-philosophers of language are capable of tracking.
Punch 2: It is claimed that (SC) cannot explain the disagreement. After all,
according to (SC), Sally is claiming that, for all Sally knows, Joe might be in Boston.
And George is denying that, for all George knows, Joe might be in Boston. On these
readings, there is no dispute. Hence, (SC) does not accommodate a pretty ordinary
case of epistemic modal disagreement.
Arguably, on the (SC) reading, disagreement is not even possible---or at least it is
not possible to have a modal epistemic disagreement via an affirmation and a denial
of a free-standing epistemic modal claim. The state of asserting, while someone else
is denying, an unmodified, unembedded epistemic modal-claim cannot constitute a
disagreement, because by (SC) such utterances are always about the states of their
users. Multiple users implies multiple subject matters.

This is not the most careful formulation of the position. It obviously cannot handle
epistemic possibilities that are not logically possible. To resolve this, one usually
reads “x does not know not-p” for “p is compatible with what s knows”. If the reader
wishes, she may substitute.
7 The example is borrowed and modified from MacFarlane (2011: 147-149).
6
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The obvious response to the above argument, which MacFarlane foreshadows, is
that contextualism is not solipsistic. It is not only about the speaker’s knowledge.
Historically, we do not find many solipsists. Compare, G.E. Moore (1962: 279),
Hacking (1967: 153), Teller (1972: 312), Kratzer (1977) and DeRose (1991: 593594). We see that these earliest expressions of contextualism about epistemic
modals are indeed non-solipsistic. Among these, Hacking is least obviously nonsolipsistic. However see DeRose (1991: 587-588) for a non-solipsistic reading of
Hacking. MacFarlane (2011: 150, n.4) points out, by contrast, that Jason Stanley
(2005a: 128) appears to be a solipsist. Notice also that Robert Stalnaker (1984: 143)
is solipsistic.8
The foregoing argument is useful to elucidate the structure of MacFarlane’s
argument against any brand of contextualism, even flexible non-solipsistic
contextualisms. Perhaps your favorite brand of contextualism says that a mightclaim that p is true just in case p is compatible with what is known collectively by
the speaker and her conversational partners. Call this Conversational Group
Contextualism (CGC):
(CGC)
“It might be that p” is true as uttered by x (at time t) iff p is compatible
with K,
where K is the set of propositions collectively known by x and her
conversational partners (at time t).
To reload the argument from disagreement, just modify the early dialog so that
George is not part of the conversation when Sally speaks, but instead is
eavesdropping nearby:
(Local Eavesdropper)
Sally says to her friend Jane, “Joe might be in Boston”. Then George (who is
eavesdropping in the closet) jumps out and says, “You are wrong! It’s false
that he might be in Boston. I just saw him down the hall.”9
Here comes the one-two punch. First, the intuition is supposed to be that Jane and
Sally disagree about whether Joe might be in Boston. Second, notice that the
aforementioned brand of contextualism cannot explain this. According to that
theory, Sally’s claim is only about her knowledge and the knowledge of her
conversational partner, Jane. George was not a conversational partner because (for
At least one of us, the present authors, is sympathetic to solipsism. We reflect in
the final section on how a solipsist might think about our findings.
9 The example is modified from MacFarlane (2011: 151). Incidentally, he uses the
case to motivate retraction data, rather than disagreement data. Our use should not
be contested. From the relativist’s point of view, it is only because Sally and George
cannot both be right (from any one point of assessment) that a retraction on Sally’s
part would be warranted in light of George’s more informed claim.
8
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whatever immature reason) he was hiding in the closet at the time of Sally’s
utterance. So Sally claimed that Joe’s being is Boston is compatible with what she
and Jane collectively know. And George denied that Joe’s being in Boston is
compatible with what he, Sally and Jane collectively know. Those are two distinct
subject matters, and so, Sally and George are talking past one another. Indeed, they
may both speak the truth, and so, (CGC) fails to accommodate the dispute.
At this point the contextualist has a number of moves. For instance she can deny
that there is a decisive disagreement-intuition or she can deny that the above form
of contextualism is flexible enough. We will revisit the disagreement intuitions in
Section 3. Let us here follow MacFarlane’s response to an increase in flexibility.
Here is one way to increase flexibility. Note that conversations do not occur at a
time, but at a time-span. Perhaps a plausible contextualism should reflect this by
claiming that a might-claim that p is true when and only when p is compatible with
what is known by anyone who engages with the speaker or participates in the
conversation. Such a theory may allow for the relevance of local eavesdroppers. For
it dictates that they are relevant when in fact they join the conversation.
A weaker version of the restriction would dictate the relevance of anybody in a
position to join the conversation. Call it (CGC-2) to indicate that it is another brand of
Conversational Group Contextualism.
(CGC-2)
“It might be that p” is true as uttered by x (in a conversation that spans t1tn) iff p is compatible with K,
where K is the set of propositions collectively known by x and anyone in a
position to join the conversation (between t1 and tn).
This sort of move invites an instance of a charge, found at MacFarlane (2011: 152),
that if we can include the knowledge of local eavesdroppers as relevant to a mightclaim, then it is less clear why anyone would take themselves to be in a position to
make a might-claim. For they would have to have views about what is known by
would-be eavesdroppers, whose existence they may not even be aware of. However,
this instance of the charge would be overstated. For typically there are no local
eavesdroppers (or local eavesdroppers in a position to join the conversation). And
barring any good reason to think there are some, we are in a position reasonably to
suppose that there are none.
MacFarlane’s central argument against such flexibility is one more variation on our
now well-rehearsed argument from lost disagreement. The variation modifies the
dialog to include a remote eavesdropper---a listener who essentially is not in a
position to join in the speaker’s conversation. For MacFarlane (2011: 151) claims,
“you’d assess [Sally’s] claim the same way if [the eavesdropper] were thousands of
miles away, listening through a wiretap.” Here’s a case of that kind:

7

(Remote Eavesdropper)
Sally says to a friend, “Joe might be in Boston”, and FBI agent Frank
(who is eavesdropping by wiretap from a great distance) thinks to
himself, “Wrong! It’s false that he might be in Boston. I just saw him in
Berkeley 20 minutes ago.”10
Again comes the one-two punch. First it is alleged that our intuition is that Sally and
Frank dispute an epistemic modal fact. Second, it is noticed that (CGC-2) cannot
accommodate that dispute. After all, Frank is not in a position to join Sally’s
conversation. So his knowledge is not relevant to the content or truth value of her
claim. Once again we find that, on the contextualist view in question, our subjects
are talking past one another. They may both speak the truth, and therefore, are not
in a state of disagreement.
MacFarlane sums up his thoughts about the contextualist strategy of increased
flexibility:
So far, the move away from solipsism seems well-motivated and plausible.
The problem is that once we let data about third-party assessments …
motivate an expansion of the contextually relevant group to include more
than just the speaker, there is no way to stop this machine. The same kind of
arguments that motivate expanding the relevant group of knowers to include
George (in our [Local Eavesdropper] example above) will motivate
expanding the relevant group of knowers to include anybody who will ever
consider the claim.11
It is only because MacFarlane takes us to judge a disagreement between the speaker
claiming that might-p and anyone who will ever consider that claim (who knows
not-p) that he would claim that the contextualist needs to include such persons as
part of the relevant group. But that is a questionable assumption. Whether any
such person really is in a state of disagreement with the speaker (or that we
intuitively judge so) is yet to be seen. We dispute the claim in Section 3 with
empirical data. However, before we move on, let us examine just how serious
MacFarlane’s expansion-conclusion would be for contextualism, if it were true---that
is, if the disagreement-judgment were as consistent across the entire class of
structurally similar cases.
The resulting contextualist proposal would have to say that “might-p” is true just in
case p is compatible with what is known by anybody who will ever consider the
claim. Of course, on this view it is not clear why anyone would ever think they are in
a position to assert a might-claim. It amounts to claiming, in cases where we are
Remote eavesdropping cases are considered also in Egan (2007) and Wright
(2007). The former, but not the latter, is in agreement with MacFarlane on the force
of this sort of case.
11 MacFarlane (2011: 151).
10
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ignorant about whether p, that nobody who will ever consider this claim will ever
know not-p. We are generally never in a position to assert that. So if MacFarlane is
correct, then contextualism entails a general unassertibility thesis.
These considerations would also strap the contextualist with semantic
unknowability. A speaker is afflicted with this ailment when there is no way in
principle for her to know what she is expressing at the time of her utterance. Since
on the view we are considering, the content of an epistemic modal claim is
determined at least in part by the epistemic states of subjects who will consider the
claim in the future, and it is usually unknowable to the speaker at the time of
utterance which people will eventually consider her claim, it follows that the
speaker at the time of utterance is usually not in a position to know what she is
expressing.
Another unacceptable consequence of MacFarlane’s expansion-conclusion may be
semantic nihilism, depending on one’s metaphysics of the future. This is the view
that our might-claims do not have any semantic content, given the non-existence of
the future. For the content of our might-claims then depends on something that
does not yet exist (viz., future circumstances in which people are considering our
might-claims). Alternatively, semantic instability threatens if a single utterance at a
given time has a content that changes later as more and more people consider that
past utterance. Those are a few potential variations on the bizarre nature of
epistemic modal content, if in fact the content of a presently expressed epistemic
modal claim depends on what happens in the future.
And if we read MacFarlane’s “anyone who will ever consider the claim” as being
about both actual and possible subjects, then an even more catastrophic
consequence emerges for a contextualist that accepts MacFarlane’s disagreement
data. Epistemic possibility more or less collapses into metaphysical necessity. For
let x stand in a transworld relation to y. Then given the usual set-up of the
argument, x and y disagree. Hence, the contextualist is committed to a very weak
notion of “relevant group”. It includes anyone that considers the claim and knows
not-p---anywhere at any time in any world. The upshot is that “might(p)” will be
true at a context of use if and only if it is impossible to know not-p. Putting aside
Fitch-paradoxical propositions (like ‘p but nobody ever knows p’), it is impossible to
know not-p just in case p is necessary. Therefore, at least for all non-Fitch
paradoxical p, a might-claim that p will be true just in case p is necessary.
In sum, if (i) MacFarlane’s disagreement data is robust, and (ii) the disagreement
intuitions that motivate expanding the relevant group of knowers at all also
motivate expanding the relevant group to include anybody who will ever consider
the claim, then contextualism is in deep trouble. The foundation of the argument,
however, is the disagreement data. So if MacFarlane’s data is not robust (and the
disagreement intuitions are not as widespread as he suggests), then the
contextualist is not pressured to expand the relevant group so radically. She can
stop the MacFarlanean machine before it dooms her thesis.
9

2. The Preclusion of Joint Accuracy
Disagreement, in MacFarlane’s (2009: 4) target sense, is a state and not an activity.
He is interested in the sense in which people disagree, and not in a sense in which
people are having a disagreement. The latter he claims is what people do when they
take themselves to be in a state of disagreement, and for this reason is less
fundamental than the state of disagreement. Having a disagreement, MacFarlane
points out, depends on peoples’ actions and attitudes towards each other. By
contrast, a state of disagreement depends only on their first-order attitudes, such
that people can be in a state of disagreement even if they do not know of each
other’s existence. Two people may be in a state of disagreement without taking
themselves to be in that state, and two people may take themselves to be in state of
disagreement when in fact they are not in that state.
Moreover, MacFarlane is interested in a kind of disagreement that we can track and
have intuitive judgments about. After all, relativism is alleged to explain, better than
contextualism, why we have the intuitive judgments that we have about when there
is and when there is not a epistemic modal dispute. If we do not track the relevant
state, then relativism does not explain our overt judgments about the state. One
must then take care when testing these judgments that our subjects are indeed
tracking the relevant state, and not reporting on something else, like the activity of
disagreeing. After all, presumably people are able to track both, and we wish our
data to bear on the contextualism- debate that MacFarlane is framing.
MacFarlane (2007: 22-23; 2009: 11-13) asks us to depart from the traditional
notion of disagreement, which says that two parties are in a state of disagreement
just in case the one accepts the very same proposition that the other rejects. This
phenomenon by itself does not always generate a disagreement in the relevant
sense. Consider the case where I affirm that Obama is president, while my
counterpart in an altogether different possible world (where Obama lost the
election) correctly denies that Obama is president. Although I affirm the very same
proposition that my counterpart denies, you do not judge my counterpart and I to be
in a state of disagreement. There is no substantial dispute between us. We can both
be right because both of our claims are accurate.
In the above example, my affirmation that Obama is president is true relative to the
circumstance of evaluation that matters for the proper assessment of that
affirmation (i.e., relative to the actual world), while my counterpart’s denial that
Obama is president is true relative to the circumstance of evaluation that matters
for the proper assessment of his claim (i.e., relative to my counterpart’s merely
possible world). From your current point of assessment, both claims are accurate--in the sense that each is true relative to the circumstance of evaluation that matters
for its proper assessment. That is why, on MacFarlane’s view, you may correctly
judge that the two parties are not in a state of disagreement, even though one is
affirming the very proposition that the other is denying. That is, from your point of
assessment, their claims are both accurate. For MacFarlane (2007: 26), there is a
10

genuine disagreement in the target sense, only if from the given point of assessment
the accuracy of one claim (or attitude) precludes the accuracy of the other.
MacFarlane’s development of the notion of accuracy is debate-neutral in a number
of respects. We say,
An acceptance (rejection) is accurate just in case the proposition accepted
is true (false) at the circumstance of evaluation that is relevant to the
assessment of the acceptance (rejection) in its context…. (2007: 23)
The notion does not presuppose answers to interesting questions about which
circumstance is relevant to the proper assessment of the target utterances. So for
instance, if the circumstance that is relevant to the assessment of my utterance “Bob
is sitting” is the world w and time t of my utterance, as advocated by a temporalist
about propositions, then that utterance is accurate just in case the proposition
expressed by “Bob is sitting” is true at <w, t>. By contrast, an eternalist like Frege,
believes that a contingent proposition is about, among other things, the time of
utterance. “Bob is sitting”, as uttered at time t, expresses the proposition that Bob is
sitting at t. Accordingly the circumstance that is relevant to the assessment of that
utterance is merely the world of utterance. If the eternalist is right, then my
utterance, “Bob is sitting”, is accurate just in case the proposition expressed is true
at the world of utterance. The contrast is between whether the contextually
relevant feature, in this case a time of utterance, is built into the content of the claim
or its circumstance of evaluation.
In the case of epistemic modals there is a further contrast. Not only does our
contextualist and MacFarlane’s relativist differ on whether the relevant state of
information plays a content-determining role versus a circumstance-determining
role, they differ also on what they take to be the relevant state of information. Our
contextualist takes the relevant epistemic state to be some function of the speaker’s
use, while MacFarlane’s relativist essentially takes it to be a function of the
assessor’s assessment of that use. Since the two positions differ on both the content
and the relevant circumstance of evaluation of a given epistemic modal utterance,
there are at least two possible reasons why they may differ on their verdicts about
the accuracy of such an utterance. They may differ on the proposition expressed or
on the circumstance that matters. But nothing in the notion of accuracy appears to
beg the question one way rather than the other on either of these fronts.
MacFarlane’s (2009: 10) target sense of disagreement, preclusion of joint accuracy
(PJA), depends on the notion of accuracy and is intended to be debate-neutral as
well. (PJA) says,
x and y disagree with respect to their attitudes/utterances just in case the
accuracy of one precludes the accuracy of the other.

11

Another formulation (2007: 24) says that x and y disagree in the target sense just in
case “the acceptance and the rejection cannot both be accurate.”12 For the case of
contingent claims uttered by x and y, these two explications are meant to come to
the same thing. Nothing theoretical is added to this target sense of disagreement
that appears to beg the question in favor of relativism over contextualism (or vice
versa).
The contextualist and relativist disagree about which notion of accuracy matters for
the truth or falsity of epistemic modal claims. Do we evaluate modal epistemic
claims relative to simply a world as our contextualist will argue, or relative to both a
world and the assessor’s information state as a MacFarlanean relativist will argue?
Or is there some other circumstance that matters? Let us assume with MacFarlane
that answers to these questions are reflected in the empirical data---and in
particular by where we judge the presence of joint accuracy. Then we need only
uncover the notion of accuracy that best accommodates those judgments once
surveyed.
3. Disagreement Intuitions Surveyed
We designed two studies to test native English speakers’ judgments about the
presence of epistemic modal disagreement, in the sense of “disagreement” that we
have been discussing. We varied the conversation relation between x and y--testing for disagreement in intra-conversational and various inter-conversational
circumstances. Specifically, we placed x and y in ordinary conversational, local
eavesdropping, remote eavesdropping, and completely independent conversational
circumstances. In the first study we employ only cleaned up versions of cases from
the literature on epistemic modals---cases that have been used to motivate
contextualism or relativism. In the second study we aim for more objectivity by
first diversifying the subject matter (and setting) of the epistemic modal
conversations while holding the conversational relation fixed, and second, by
diversifying the conversational relation while holding the subject matter and setting
fixed.

MacFarlane (2007: 24; 2009: 11-12) acknowledges that these explications of
disagreement are difficult to elucidate further to handle special cases where it is
impossible for both parties to be accurate just because it is impossible for one of the
parties to be accurate. Some such cases are a problem since they are not intuitively
judged to constitute a disagreement---for instance, when I claim, “The cat is on the
mat.” and you claim, “Hesperus is not Phosphorus.” we do not seem to disagree,
even though it is not possible for both claims to be accurate. Our study will not
concern such special cases, since we restrict our discussion to the contents of
attitudes and utterances that have their truth values contingently.
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All vignettes for both studies contained cues to tip off the subjects to the epistemic
readings of the modals, including indications that epistemic states were the reasons
for assertion.13 After highlighting the modal utterances of both speakers, we asked,
“Do you agree it is possible in this case for both of their claims to be
true (at the same time)?”
The wording ensures that the subjects are evaluating for a state of disagreement
(and not an activity of disagreeing). It also makes clear that we are not asking
whether or not the subjects are merely justified.
Subjects self-reported their native language, and we excluded the data of those who
reported anything other than English. Because subjects were not excluded from
completing the experiment on the basis of native language, there would be no
incentive to lie about it. Of course, this being an internet-based survey, we cannot be
certain that all of the subjects were telling the truth about their native language. The
same is true, however, of most traditional in-person survey protocols; we rely on
subjects to be honest. No other demographic information was gathered; this is
because we expected subjects would be less likely to participate in an online survey
that requested extensive demographic information, and because gathering more
information may have required IRB approval.
We ran two screening questions, which were used to disqualify some subjects. This
was done with one narrative, (Ticket Cost), involving a clear disagreement about the
precise amount paid by x and y for their flight to Puerto Rico,14 and a second
narrative, (Indexical Claims), involving indexical utterances that were obviously
compatible (viz., x saying, “I’m hungry”, and y replying, “I’m not hungry”). Subjects
that missed the obvious answer to the disagreement-question for either of these
two narratives were eliminated from the study. These screening questions had
several purposes. First, the clear-disagreement question was used to make sure that
subjects understood the questions to be about compatibility, rather than
justification. Second, these questions were used to eliminate subject with a strong
bias to respond with either agreement or disagreement regardless of the context.
And finally, the questions were used to exclude subjects who just weren’t paying
attention or cooperating.
Study #1
This MTurk study included four vignettes: (Fred), (Boston), (Bus Stop) and (FBI).
There were 265 admissible subjects, each receiving the two screen questions (in
random order) and one of the four test questions. We begin with the case of
One further way to ensure an epistemic, rather than counterfactual, reading
would be to use “may” rather than “might”. “May” is more difficult to hear nonepistemically. Our study could be improved by this modification to the questions.
14 That question was used in Study 2, while a similar clear dispute about the precise
date of a friend’s birthday was presented in Study 1.
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(Fred).15 It is the kind of case that both Kratzer and DeRose use to motivate
contextualist treatments of epistemic modals.
(FRED)
Suppose a man is approaching both of us. You and I are not together, and you
are much closer to him than I am. I can only see the bare outlines of this man. I
say to myself, "That person might be Fred". You on the other hand, being much
closer to this man, are thinking, "That person can’t be Fred. I know Fred
doesn’t have a mustache."
•
•

I said: "That person might be Fred."
Your thought was: "That person can’t be Fred."
Question: In this case, my claim and your claim can both be true (at the same
time). Do you agree or disagree?

In (Fred) we find two subjects independently seeking the same person, Fred. They
are not in contact with one another. This however does not beg any questions
against MacFarlane, because---as we noted---disagreement is a state that does not
essentially involve an activity between two or more persons. Whether the two
parties are involved in the same conversation is irrelevant to whether they are in a
state of disagreement.
So, are the two subjects disagreeing in (Fred)? Contextualism, ala Kratzer or DeRose,
predict NO. The position predicts that both claims can be true (at the same time),
since the truth values of the two modal claims depend on distinct utterance
contexts. The contexts importantly differ on the relevant information available to
the subjects. By constrast, MacFarlane’s relativistic version of PJA predicts
disagreement between the claims of the two parties. Relative to any one state of
assessment only one of the two parties can be right. So qua assessor, the informant
is predicted, according to relativistic-PJA, to intuit a disagreement between them.
Responses to the questions were analyzed for statistical significance using a logistic
regression model.16 What we find is that informants agree that both speakers can
Modified from Kratzer (1986: 9) Our narrative differs from her version in that we
do not suggestively build the contextualist answer to the question into the
narrative. See Nat Hansen (2011) for discussion of this confound as it
appears in the epistemic contextualist literature.
16 Generally speaking, this is a model that investigates the effect of some
experimental manipulation on the likelihood of a response variable. In a logistic or
logit model, the response is binary (yes/no). In this case, the experimental
manipulations are the various forms of the modal question, and the binary response
variable is agree/disagree. What we model here is how particular modal questions
affect the likelihood of subjects’ responding ‘agree’. In particular, this model takes as
its dependent variable the log odds (or logit) of an ‘agree’ response. This is the
15
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be right about 62% of the time, a level significantly above chance: b = 0.489, z = 2.00,
p < 0.05. If the judgments about disagreement are tracking a preclusion of joint
accuracy, then the results do not favor a relativist reading, but do favor a
contextualist reading of accuracy.
We turn now to (Boston). It is the kind of case that MacFarlane uses to motivate
relativist treatments of epistemic modals.17
(BOSTON)
Sally and George are discussing Joe's whereabouts. Sally says, "Joe might be in
Boston." George replies, "Joe can’t be in Boston. I just had breakfast with him
here in Los Angeles 30 minutes ago."
•
•

Sally said: "Joe might be in Boston."
George replied: "Joe can’t be in Boston."
Question: In this case, Sally's claim and George's claim can both be true (at the
same time). Do you agree or disagree?

A natural non-solipsistic contextualism will predict a disagreement here. So it
predicts disagreement with the claim that both parties can be right. After all, nonsolipsistic contextualism allows that the context of utterance is broad enough in an
ordinary conversational setting to make relevant the information that is available to
the conversational participants collectively. On this understanding Sally and George
each make claims about the same body of information. Of course, relativism agrees
with the verdict but for a different reason. Relativism predicts that our informant
will evaluate both modal claims against her own body of information. Whatever
that information happens to be, one party will be wrong if the other is right. For
either Bill’s being in Boston is compatible with her information or it is not. Hence,
the speakers cannot both be right (at the same time).
Here we find that only 37% of informants agree that the speakers can both be right,
significantly less often than chance: b = -0.533, z = -2.20, p < 0.05. The tendency to
agree that both parties can be right here is significantly below (Fred). It is also
significantly below (Bus Stop), which we discuss below: b > 1, z > 2.5, p < 0.01 for
both comparisons. So the result is a tendency toward disagreement in (Boston).18
natural logarithm of ( p (agree) / p (¬agree) ). In what follows, results are reported
with a coefficient b, which is the size of the effect in log odds; a z score, also known
as a Wald z statistic; and a p-value, the probability of type I error (rejecting a true
null hypothesis) associated with the Wald test statistic.
17 Modified from MacFarlane (2011)
18 The comparison between (Boston) and (FBI), presented below, does not reach
statistical significance.
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That result is consistent with relativism, but it also consistent with non-solipsistic
contextualism.
Let us now look at (Bus Stop), which is a case of local eavesdropping. Preliminary
surveys revealed that subjects were heavily distracted by cases like MacFarlane’s
that had eavesdroppers jumping out of closets. So we tested this more natural
example:
(Bus Stop)
Sally arrived at the bus stop a bit late with her friend Betty. Sally worries, "We
might have missed our bus." A bystander, George, is quietly eavesdropping. He
mutters to himself, "They can’t have missed their bus. I’ve been here for an
hour and know that the bus has not yet arrived."
•
•

Sally said: "We might have missed our bus."
George muttered: "They can’t have missed their bus."
Question: In this case, Sally's claim and George's claim can both be true (at the
same time). Do you agree or disagree?

Contextualists who by default treat only the knowledge of the conversational
participants as relevant will predict here no disagreement---that the subjects can
both be right. After all, Sally and George are not part of the same conversation.
Relativists by contrast will once again predict a disagreement. Again, they say that
Sally and George cannot both be right from any one point of assessment.
74% of the time our subjects agree that both parties can be right, significantly above
chance: b = 1.030, z = 3.01, p < 0.001. The result is predicted by contextualism, but
not relativism. We find significantly more agreement here than in (Boston), which,
recall, had an effect in the direction of intuited disagreement.
What happens in cases of remote eavesdropping?19 For instance,
(FBI)
Sally and George are having a conversation at home and discussing Joe's
whereabouts. FBI Agent Frank has planted a bug, and from headquarters is
eavesdropping on their conversation:
George: "Do you know where Joe is?"
Sally: "No I don't. But he might be in Boston. He considered going there for an
important meeting."
FBI Agent Frank (to a colleague at headquarters): "Joe can't be in Boston. Our
guys arrested Joe in Los Angeles 20 minutes ago."

19

The example here is modified from Crispin Wright (2007).
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•
•

Sally said: "[Joe] might be in Boston."
Agent Frank Replied: "Joe can't be in Boston."
Question: In this case, Sally's claim and Agent Frank's claim can both be true
(at the same time). Do you agree or disagree?

There are expressions of skepticism about MacFarlane’s claim that there is a clear
intuition of disagreement in (remote) eavesdropping cases.20 And the contextualist
of course would deny disagreement here and predict a pattern of subjects who
agree that Sally and Agent Frank can both be right. What do our results show?
The result does support the conclusion that remote eavesdropping cases are not
obvious cases of disagreement. Our informants did not know what to make of (FBI),
with almost exactly 50% agreeing that both speakers can be right. Comparisons to
(Fred) and (Boston) here, though on the order of 10-15% difference, do not reach
statistical significance. (FBI) does, however, elicit significantly fewer ‘agree’
responses than (Bus Stop): b = 1.030, z = -2.63, p < 0.01. In other words, subjects are
as likely to intuit ‘agree’ here as they are to detect a dispute, but not as often as in
our local eavesdropping case, (Bus Stop). It is not clear why the two eavesdropping
cases should differ significantly in this way. One possibility is that is that (FBI) is
inherently a more adversarial context than (Bus Stop). For instance, FBI agents are
likely to disagree with people they are pursuing or investigating. If the difference
really is due to idiosyncratic properties of the specific subject matter used here,
future investigation of a greater variety of contexts should bear this out. Moreover,
remote eavesdroppers, unlike local eavesdroppers, are predictably adversarial
The next study, presented below, uses a wider variety of contexts and finds no such
significant difference between local and remote eavesdropping cases, and shows
that non-modal subject-matter does have a significant affect on epistemic modal
judgments.
An alternative explanation of the randomness of the (FBI) result might be
foreshadowed by von Fintel and Gillies (2011) and Kratzer (2009), who advocate a
special brand of flexible contextualism that predicts indeterminacy in
eavesdropping cases owing, as Kratzer puts it, “to the absence of any overt or
contextually suggested relativization.” However, a question remains about why we
would not find an analogous randomness for (Bus Stop), the local eavesdropping
case. Barring further study, the indeterminacy view would have to explain how an
increase in the distance of an eavesdropper leads to a decrease in the overtness of
contextual relativization. However, as suggested Study 2 below, there really is no
significant difference between remote and local eavesdropping judgments, so
perhaps the indeterminacy view is relieved of that explanatory burden.

Versions of the criticism appear in Kai von Fintel and Tony Gillies (2008: 79, 81)
Kratzer (2009: Slide 68), Hawthorne (2007), et. al.
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Let us sum up the findings and lessons of Study 1. The primary lesson is that
MacFarlanean relativism overgenerates epistemic modal disagreement.
It
mistakenly predicts that (Fred), (Bus Stop), and (FBI) are all cases of intuitive
dispute, while the empirical data does not bear this out. Relativist-PJA is not what is
tracked by competent informants’ judgement about the cases. Dialectically,
contextualism is then in good standing. It is treated, even by MacFarlane, as the
default position. Without the amount of disagreement that MacFarlane predicts, the
argument from disagreement fails because its presupposed data is not robust.
Contextualism is then unmoved from its default status.
That said, Study 1 by itself does not fully support contextualism either. Although a
non-solipsistic contextualism predicts the first three results, (Fred), (Boston) and
(Bus Stop), it does not predict the (FBI) result. So although local eavesdropping
result for (Bus Stop) is evidence for the contextualist prediction, (FBI), our remote
eavesdropping example, is not evidence for contextualism. In (FBI) subjects were as
likely to intuit disagreement as they were agreement. We have suggested that this
may be due to the inherently adversarial nature of the (FBI) scenario, or possible
the adversarial nature of remote eavesdropping of any kind. We chose in the first
study to test cleaned up versions of examples already operating in the literature.
For those are among the familiar cases that have been used to motivate the
contextualist and relativist positions, and it is those specific motivations that we are
evaluating. Study 2 by contrast aims for minimal sequences to flesh out the affects
of non-modal subject matter on studies like Study 1.
Study #2
In the second study we duplicated from Study 1 the format of the test questions.
However, we aimed to diversify the conversational relation while holding the
subject-matter (and setting fixed) and aimed to diversify the subject-matter (and
setting) of the conversations while holding the conversational relation fixed. There
were four conversational relations (i) normal conversation, which involves x and y in
the same conversation, (ii) unrelated conversations, which involves x and y in two
independent conversations with neither speaker involved with the other, (iii) local
eavesdropping, which involves a nearby listener, and (iv) remote eavesdropping,
involving a listener that is not in a position to join the original speaker in
conversation.
For each of the four conversational relations there were four scenarios regarding
overall subject-matter of conversation and environment in which the conversation
occurred---specifically, utterances (a) in a coffee shop about a performer, (b) at the
bus stop about the arrival of the bus, (c) in the class room regarding the passing of a
math test, and (d) in the setting of an academic journal regarding research on the
origins of the Mesoamericans.
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We conducted four distinct questionnaires (via MTurk), each included the two
screen questions plus four test questions. No one study duplicated either a
conversational relation or an environmental scenario. So every conversational
relation and every environmental scenario were represented once in every study,
with no subjects taking more than one study. There were between 120 and 150
admissible native English subjects in each of the four questionnaires (after
eliminating for over-generation or under-generation of disagreement in the screen
questions).21
Study 2 was analyzed with a mixed-effects logistic regression model using crossed
random effects of subject and subject-matter. Our general findings are that, with a
few exceptions, (1) subjects’ likelihoods of judging epistemic modal disagreement
are not much different from chance; (2) differences in conversational relation (e.g.,
normal conversation vs eavesdropping) do not affect the likelihood of these
judgments; and (3) situational differences (i.e., those differences in non-modal
subject-matter and setting of the vignettes) do affect the likelihood of such
judgments. We discuss these in that order.
First, crossing the parameters on the question of whether our subjects detected a
genuine dispute, the results were not much difference from chance (0.5). Although,
6 of the 16 modal questions do elicit response patterns that differ from chance
(boldfaced in the chart below):

Coffee
MathTest
BusStop
Academic

Normal
Unrelated
Conversation Conversations

Local
Remote
Eavesdropping Eavesdropping

0.4545455
0.4473684
0.5428571
0.64

0.3846154
0.4
0.5545455
0.5087719

0.3596491
0.4090909
0.5322581
0.5714286

0.376
0.4380952
0.5526316
0.6727273

The screening questions were more clear-cut. The percentage of subjects detecting
dispute for the modal questions ranges from 36% to 67%. By contrast, for the nonmodal screening questions, only 24% judged no dispute to an obvious disagreement
(Ticket Cost), and 97% claimed no dispute for an obvious non-dispute in (Indexical
Claims). This reflects the fact that intuitions are less consistent across subjects
evaluating for modal disagreement than they are at evaluating for non-modal
disagreement. In other words, these are much more difficult judgments than the
obvious cases used in the screening.

As expected, almost all subjects, around 95%, agreed that in (Indexical Claims)
both x and y may speak the truth, and most subjects, approximately 73%, correctly
denied in (Ticket Cost) that both may speak the truth. Hence, a strong majority of
subjects appear to be relatively attentive.
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4 of the 6 questions that do reflect results better than chance are consistent with
what would be predicted by a non-solipsistic conversational-participants
contextualism. Those were (Coffee, Unrelated Conversations), (Coffee, Local
Eavesdropping) and (Coffee, Remote Eavesdropping), all of which lean significantly
toward “no disagreement”, and (Academic, Normal Conversation), which leans
significantly toward “disagreement”. 3 of the 6 questions that reflect results better
than chance are consistent with what would be predicated by the relativist.
(Academic, Normal Conversation), (Academic, Local Eavesdropping) and (Academic,
Remote Eavesdropping), all of which lean significantly toward “disagreement”.
However, the preponderance of results are evidence for neither “disagreement” or
“no disagreement”, and suggests, for a truth conditional semanticist, that either
there is widespread indeterminacy of content or massive interference perhaps
owing to situation effects of the cases.
The second general finding is that the linguistic relation does not affect the
likelihood of detecting epistemic modal dispute. Here are the percentages of
subjects judging a disagreement across linguistic conditions:
Across Linguistic Relations
Normal
Unrelated
Conversation Conversations
0.52
0.47

Local
Eavesdropping
0.46

Remote
Eavesdropping
0.51

These percentages do not favor the raw predictions of any of the theories we have
been discussing. For instance, a conversational-group contextualism would predict
that eavesdropping would elicit a notable decrease in subject’s inclination to detect
a dispute as compared to a normal conversational setting. There is only one
significant difference along the scale shown above: subjects are significantly less
likely to judge disagreement across unrelated conversations than between speakers
in a normal conversation: b = -0.34, z = -2.10, p = 0.036. The less reasonable
solipsistic contextualism, however, would predict little differences across
conversational relations, predicting no disagreement in any case, including in the
normal conversational environment. And relativism would share the expectation of
little difference, but in the opposite direction---predicting disagreement across all
the conversational types. However, this aspect of the data supports neither position.
The disagreement judgments are generally not significantly more or less likely than
chance for any given linguistic condition. So the data generally supports neither
disagreement nor no-disagreement for any given linguistic relation.
The third general finding is that there are significant situation effects . In particular
we found that the (Academic Conversation) and (Bus Stop) results showed an
increased tendency to acknowledge dispute as compared to the (Math Test) and
(Coffee Shop) results, independently of the linguistic relation between the speakers.
Across Subject Matters/Settings
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CoffeeShop
0.39

MathTest
0.42

BusStop
0.55

Academic
0.60

Like with (FBI) in Study 1, (Academic Conversation) may carry an increased
tendency to acknowledge dispute because of its inherently adversarial nature.
Academics in journals typically disagree with the colleagues they are engaging and
debating. The pattern developing is that adversarial subject-matters/settings carry
an increased tendency toward judging epistemic modal dispute. This perhaps
explains the oddity in our eavesdropping results in Study 1. There we found that
the remote eavesdropping (FBI) result came back with significantly fewer subjects
agreeing that both parties may speak the truth, as compared to the local
eavesdropping (Bus Stop) result.
Here is the Study 2 data in chart form:
Incompatibility by Scenario and Condition

'Incompatible' responses (z-transformed)

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2

Intra-conversation
Inter-conversation

0

Proximal Eavesdropping
Remote eavesdropping

-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
CoffeeShop

MathTest

BusStop

AcademicDisute

Scenario

In the above chart, “intra-conversation” refers to what we have been calling a
“normal conversation”, and “inter-conversation” refers to what we have been calling
independent or “unrelated conversation.” 0 corresponds to chance (50% agreement
that the two parties can simultaneously speak the truth), negative numbers
correspond to lower than chance agreement (i.e., tendency toward “no
disagreement”), and positive numbers correspond to higher than chance agreement
(i.e., tendency toward “disagreement”). Error bars represent the 95% confidence
intervals.
That differences in subject-matter have an effect on epistemic modal judgments
should be surprising to both contextualists and relativists. That is because neither
framework antecedently has resources to explain such differences. Instead, they
predict that disagreement judgments essentially on variations in the epistemic
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states of the relevant subjects, and not on objective features of the non-modal
subject-matter under discussion.
Like with the first study, Study 2 does not generally support relativist predictions.
Only two of the sixteen test questions came back with results consistent with
relativism while inconsistent with contextualism, and those both involved
“adversarial” academic dispute scenarios. That non-modal subject matter in
particular, as compared to many other non-modal subject matters, carries a
principled bias towards disagreement.
The primary conclusion we draw is that disagreement intuitions are not after all
tracking relativistic-PJA. Indeed, Study 2 suggests that ordinary people may not be
easily tracking any notion of joint accuracy in this domain. Otherwise, their
responses would be more uniform.
Recall our understanding of MacFarlane’s position: if (i) his disagreement data is
robust and (ii) the disagreement intuitions that motivate expanding the relevant
group of knowers at all motivates expanding the relevant group to include anybody
who will ever consider the claim, then contextualism is in big trouble. In section 3
we questioned (i) at length. Since MacFarlane’s data is not robust, part (ii) loses its
force. The contextualist semantics, as the default position, only needs to
accommodate clear cases of genuine dispute. What we learned is that not many
cases from the relativist repertoire and even fewer cases from Study 2 fit that
description. To that extent the most fundamental motivation for relativism is
without legs, since the disagreement data does not favor its notion of joint accuracy.
As a refutation of relativism, Study 1 and Study 2 are overly conservative
experiments. Asking a subject to evaluate the linguistic situation in the way that we
did might indicate to the subject that it is the subject’s own background that is
relevant for determining the truth values of the epistemic modal claims. In such a
case our way of asking the questions would then bias judgments in favor of the
relativist’s assessor-sensitive predictions. Relativism, after all, avows that our
subject becomes the assessor. Still, no such bias surfaced in the results.
There are other lessons to highlight from the experiment. Subjects appear to have
great trouble evaluating for “preclusion of joint accuracy”. Why would this be? Is it
that epistemic modal disputes (if there are any) are simply and predictably harder
to track than ordinary non-modal disputes? Study 2, and its lack of consistency,
suggests that subjects may not be tracking epistemic modal dispute at all, but
instead are susceptible to situation effects of the narratives.
Perhaps solipsism has something to say here. If epistemic modal disagreement were
sufficiently rare or impossible (as solipsistic contextualism would suggest), then
perhaps subjects would be just a little baffled and would be simply trying to do their
best to make sense of a preclusion-of-joint-accuracy study. Of course this raises the
question of why our subjects did not all just answer ‘they can both be right’ on every
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trial. However, if the notion of epistemic modal disagreement is not well-formed in
the first place, then the question that we are asking is confusing. And rather than
answering the straightforwardly ‘right’ way, subjects are looking for ways of making
the question make sense.
If subjects really have no idea how to respond to our prompt, for whatever reason,
then instead of trying to answer the question, subjects are just latching onto
whatever extra-linguistic world knowledge might influence the prior probability of
disagreement happening (e.g., academics and remote eavesdroppers are a priori
more likely to disagree with the people they are listening to). And these effects are
massive, the largest we found in the study. There is also a moderately robust
difference between normal-conversational and unrelated-conversational judgments
(i.e., intra- and inter-conversational, respectively, on the chart), but it is dwarfed by
the effect of context. This means that, while non-semantic ‘situational’ effects are the
largest and most robust discovered in this experiment, we do still uncover some
generalizations about how linguistic relations affect the preclusion of joint accuracy.
People can judge the truth or falsity of epistemic modal constructions when given a
clear picture of contextual common ground, but asking them to shift that common
ground away from the context where a sentence was uttered to common ground
from a new context where either an eavesdropper or the people giving the
experiment have added more information (in order to compare the truth conditions
of statements made in the two contexts) is just too difficult a task for people to
perform.
Relatedly, it may be that ‘true at the same time’ is not a predicate that applies to two
epistemic modal claims that were made in different epistemic states. For instance, if
the index of evaluation always includes the speaker’s own epistemic states (perhaps
together with other standard parameters like worlds and times) then there is no
single index of evaluation relative to which the two claims are true. So even if the
corresponding solipsistic PJA were the index of evaluation that matters for the
proper evaluation of epistemic modal discourse, subjects might be very confused by
our survey questions.
The picture that emerges from our results is that people intuit disagreement more
often in direct conversational interactions than between people in unrelated
conversations (although judgments are not particularly clear in either case), and
intuitions are all over the place with regard to eavesdropping cases of any kind,
essentially tracking properties of the general context rather than anything
specifically semantic.
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